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EMTALA and Hospital "Community
Engagement": The Search for a Rational
Policy
SARA ROSENBAUMt
BRUCE SIEGELtt
MARSHA REGENSTEINttINTRODUCTION

In U.S. health law, the Emergency Medical Treatment
and Labor Act (EMTALA) I is unique in both structure and
scope. Codified as part of the Medicare statute, EMTALA
creates a universal, explicit, and individually enforceable
right to certain emergency services from Medicareparticipating hospitals; 2 as such, the law occupies a
singular position in a legal environment otherwise devoid 3of
health care rights and shaped primarily by market forces.

t
J.D.; Hirsh Professor and Chair, Department of Health Policy, The George
Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services
tt M.D., M.P.H.; Research Professor, Department of Health Policy, The George
Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services
tttPh.D.; Associate Research Professor, Department of Health Policy, The
George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2005).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(2). For an excellent overview of EMTALA, see
Tiana Mayere Lee, An EMTALA Primer: The Impact of Changes in the
Emergency Medicine Landscape on EMTALA Compliance and Enforcement, 13
ANNALS HEALTH L. 145, 151-53 (2004).
3. For a discussion of health care rights and the dominance of markets in
U.S. health law, see RAND E. ROSENBLATT, SYLVIA A. LAw & SARA ROSENBAUM,
LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, at ch. 2(A)(1) (1997 & Supp.
2001). For a highly market-driven view of the U.S. health care system, see FED.
TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF
COMPETITION (2004).
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EMTALA specifies a relatively straightforward (we
emphasize the word "relatively," since there are countless
EMTALA cases in which hospitals challenge the nature and
scope of their legal obligations) 4 set of duties regarding
provision of emergency care to persons who seek help. The
law specifies government sanctions for violators, 5 as well as
private suits for damages by injured persons 6 and by other
facilities that suffer financial losses as a direct result of a
violation of the law. 7 In its scope and reach, EMTALA can
perhaps best be understood as a reflection of a public belief
that in the wealthiest nation in the world, people should not
be turned away from, or thrown out of, hospitals to die on
8
the streets.
Not surprisingly perhaps, many hospitals and
physicians are ambivalent about EMTALA. Public
institutions that perform a disproportionate proportion of
health care for the indigent 9 tend to support the law
because of its access-promoting and redistributive effects.
The powerful private health care institutions that comprise
the bulk of U.S. hospitals and that are not bound by legal
obligations10 to treat potentially non-paying patients,
4. Lee, supra note 2, does a nice job of reviewing many of the most
important cases. Standard health law textbooks similarly review EMTALA
cases at length. See, e.g., ROSENBLATT, LAW & ROSENBAUM, supra note 2, at ch.
1(D); BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS,
at ch. 8(11) (5th ed. 2004).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(A) authorizes the imposition of civil money
penalties on hospitals for the negligent violation of the law. Physicians also can
be subject to civil money penalties under § 1395dd(d)(1)(B).
6. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) permits private suits against participating hospitals.
Private suits against physicians are not authorized. 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(d)(2)(A).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(B).
8. The roots of EMTALA lie in the publicity of extreme cases. See Lee, supra
note 2, at 146-51.
9. For an overview of the uncompensated care costs borne by public
hospitals, see Ingrid Singer et al., National Association of Public Hospitals,
America's Safety Net Hospitals and Health Systems, 2002 (Sept. 2004), at
http://www.naph.org//Content/ContentGroups/Publicationsl/MON_2004_9_Cha
racter 2002.pdf. In fiscal year 2002, eighty-one public hospitals furnished more
than 24% of all uncompensated hospital care furnished nationally. Id. at 2.
10. Of course many institutions may believe that they have a moral or
ethical obligation to furnish at least some care to persons who cannot pay, as
well as to furnish lifesaving emergency care. Hospitals are not always so heroic
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frequently object to the duties imposed under the law. The
objection to the imposition of federal legal duties as a
virtual condition of participation in Medicare is shared by
the emergency care and specialty physicians who must
carry out EMTALA's obligations. A frequently heard refrain
is that the law makes it impossible for overburdened
medical staff to divert individuals who allege a medical
emergency but who, in their opinion, could be better
managed in a community clinical setting. 1 EMTALA's clear
and tough sanctions and liability exposure are intensified
by the fact that the law contains no direct financing
of Medicare
mechanism, but instead operates as a condition
12
participation and an unfunded mandate.
The absence of a direct financing mechanism has taken
on real significance as the nation's uninsured problem has
reached the point at which no community is spared.1 3 In
in performing basic access functions. In recent years, attention has been focused
on hospital billing practices aimed at the uninsured, with hospitals charging
the most exorbitant fees to their uninsured patients and pursuing aggressive
billing practices including seizure of homes and meager bank accounts and
attachment of modest earnings. See Health Care Costs and Instability of
Insurance: Impact on Patients' Experiences with Care and Medical Bills:
Hearing on a Review of Hospital Billing and Collection Practices Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
U.S. House of Reps., 108th Cong. (June 24, 2004) (statement of Sara Collins,
Fund),
at
Commonwealth
Officer,
The
Program
Senior
http://www.cmwf.org/usr-doc/collinsimpact test_760.pdf. The hospital industry
has argued that federal Medicare payment rules compel this conduct, a charge
that was publicly refuted in a 2004 letter from United States Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Tommy Thompson to the
President of the American Hospital Association. Letter from Tommy G.
Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services, to Richard J. Davidson,
President, American Hospital Association (Feb. 19, 2004), http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2004pres/20040219.html. At the same time, Medicare's own bad
debt payment policies require hospitals to use aggressive collection efforts prior
to claiming financial recovery under the program. See, e.g., In re Battle Creek
Health System, [2004 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH)
81,261 (CMS Adm'r Nov. 12, 2004).
11. Collectively the authors of this article have had this very conversation
with health professionals on countless occasions. See Lee, supra note 2, at 16468, for a litany of issues typically raised in opposition to EMTALA.
12. See id. at 166.
13. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, A SHARED DESTINY: COMMUNITY EFFECTS OF
UNINSURANCE (2003). This study focuses on the community-wide effects of high
numbers of uninsured persons, identifying both overcrowded emergency
departments and system-wide strains on health care services and institutions.
The report also found that the higher the proportion of uninsured low-income
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2003, some forty-five million persons14-more than 18% of
the non-elderly population-were uninsured. If analysis of
the uninsured is expanded to include persons who
experienced some time without insurance coverage over the
2002-2003 two-year time period, this forty-five million
figure leaps to eighty-two million persons. 15 Moreover, the
problem is not only a total lack of insurance; underinsurance is becoming a major concern as well, as
employers raise deductibles and co-payments and introduce
limits on benefits as a means of containing costs.16 The
underinsured fall on the sick with
economic effects of being
17
particular harshness.
While hospitals might perceive EMTALA's financial
burdens as considerable, it is also difficult to imagine the
disappearance of so fundamental a public safety protection
as the right of access to emergency hospital care. The duties
and rights afforded by EMTAIA did not appear overnight;
indeed, the law rests on a series of federal and state law

persons as a total proportion of the community population, the more serious the
access barriers. Id. at ch. 2.
14. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, INCOME, POVERTY AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED

STATES: 2003, tbl. C-1 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2004pubs/p6O-226.pdf.
15. FAMILIES USA, ONE-IN-THREE: NON-ELDERLY AMERICANS WITHOUT
at
2004),
available
2002-2003
(June
INSURANCE,
HEALTH
http://www.familiesusa.org/site/DocServer/82million uninsuremergencydepart
ment-report.pdf?doclD=3641.
16. For a comprehensive analysis of changes in the employer-sponsored
health plan market, see Trends and Indicators in the Changing Health Care
Marketplace, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found.,
New York, N.Y.), 2004, at § 4, at http:/Iwww.kff.org/insurance/7031/ti2OO4-4set.cfm (information updated Feb. 2, 2005).

17. The magnitude of the underinsured problem (i.e., inadequate coverage
in relation to need for care and ability to pay for care) can be seen in a recent
study examining the proportion of all U.S. bankruptcies related to medical care
costs. See David U. Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributors to
Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 2, 2005, at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprint/hlthaff.w5.63vl. This study found that about half of all personal
bankruptcies during the 2001 study period reported medical costs as the
underlying problem and that half of all debtors had some form of health
insurance at the onset of their illness. Id.
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in the
precedents, 18 and its key elements are reflected
19
hospital industry's own operating standards.
As U.S. hospital policy enters the twenty-first century,
we believe that it is useful to take a step back and consider
EMTALA in the broader arena of U.S. health policy as it
relates to accessible community health services. In this
context, two important but related challenges emerge. The
first is how to pay for emergency care screening and
stabilization services, which are essential to any health care
system, but particularly so in a society without a universal
financing mechanism for even basic health care. The second
broader challenge-and one that emerges from an
exploration of how hospitals function within communitiesis how to promote what we term in this article a policy of
"active engagement" among hospitals in building accessible
health care systems within their service areas.
In our view, the concept of "active engagement" in
community health care should be understood as part of the
fundamental mission of hospitals in the twenty-first
century. We believe that this shift in view regarding the
proper role of hospitals is consistent with the growing
emphasis on the provision of care outside of the four walls
of hospitals, 20 as well as a growing understanding of the
need to promote access to early and timely health care as a
basic element of health care quality. 21 Toward that end, we
believe that U.S. health care financing policies should be
revised to incentivize such conduct. Thus, we advocate
18. ROSENBLATT, LAW & ROSENBAUM, supra note 3, at 60-64.

19. See, e.g., Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987) (finding the
duty to maintain properly functioning emergency departments is so basic as to
be nondelegable).
20. In 1975, there were more than 7100 licensed U.S. hospitals with nearly
1.5 million beds. By 2002, that number had declined to fewer than 5800
hospitals with about 976,000 beds. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, Pub. No. 2004-1232, HEALTH UNITED STATES, tbl. 109 (2004).

21. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A
NEw HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2001). The basic tenet of this
landmark report is that health care should be safe, effective, patient-centered,
timely, efficient, and equitable. Id. at 39-60. The essential meaning of this basic
tenet is that people ought to be able to secure good health care in the setting
most appropriate to their health care needs and ought not to have to turn to
emergency departments for timely treatment unless they have medical
emergencies.
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reforms that create a financing mechanism for emergency
screening and stabilization services, with eligibility tied to
measurable standards of "engaged community action" on
the part of hospitals. Our recommendations are consistent
with the recent and growing emphasis on the concept of
"pay for performance," which has attracted considerable
attention in recent years 22 and which seeks to link health
to specific types of quality-promoting
care payments
23
activities.
Our conclusion regarding the need for an active
engagement policy stems principally from a multi-year
project undertaken for the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation. The project had a dual purpose: to improve the
performance of hospital emergency departments and to
examine the problem of hospital emergency department
over-crowding within the broader context of health care
access in the communities served by the study hospitals.
Following an overview of EMTAIA in Part II, we present
the results of this project in Part III and discuss the concept
of "active engagement" in Part IV.

II. AN OVERVIEW

OF THE EMTALA STATUTE AND
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS

A. The Statute
EMTALA was enacted as part of the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985.24 From a legal
perspective, EMTALA can be understood in part as an
25
outgrowth of the broad community service obligation
contained in the Hospital Survey and Construction Act of
22. See id. at 81-206.
23. When the official Medicare Payment Advisory Commission released its
2005 report on Medicare payments to Congress for example, the concept of "pay
for performance" dominated the analysis. See News Release, Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission Releases
Report on Medicare Payment Policy (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.medpac.gov/
publications/other-reports/Mar05_NewsRelease .pdf
24. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). As a result of political disagreements, although the
legislation is titled "1985," it was not enacted into law until the following year.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (2005).
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1946 (Hill-Burton Act),26 which was subsequently
translated into an explicit emergency care obligation in the
1979 regulations. 27 EMTALA also has roots in state law: as
of its enactment, twenty-two states had their own laws
mandating at least a limited amount of emergency hospital
care. 28 Furthermore, in a number of jurisdictions, courts
already had begun to articulate a legal duty on the part of
hospitals to render care in emergencies, using long-standing
common law theories such as public function, undertaking,
and detrimental reliance. 29 In short, by the time of
EMTALA's passage, the societal belief (as reflected in the
law) that hospitals should make emergency care available
to all persons in need of care was hardly radical, although
the scope of EMTALA surpassed any previous set of
obligations.
The popular context for EMTALA's enactment was a
spate of stories regarding denial of emergency care and
hearings on the practice of "patient dumping." 30 But the
precipitating legal event lay in Medicare payment reform
and in growing Congressional concern over the foreseeable
results of its 1983 enactment of the Medicare hospital
3
inpatient Prospective Payment System (PPS). 1 PPS
constrained hospital payments by replacing Medicare's
retrospective system for determining costs with a
prospective, fixed-fee arrangement that tied payments to
diagnostic and treatment pairs. 32 In its statutory structure,
EMTALA reflects two basic concerns on Congress' part

26. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (2005).
27. HHS Medical Facility Community Service Provisions, 42 C.F.R.
124.603(b)(1) (2005). The rule does not define the term "emergency" but
provides that "[a] facility may not deny emergency services to any person who
resides ... in the facility's service area on the ground that the person is unable
to pay for those services." Id.
28. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. 3, at 5 (1985).

29. ROSENBLATT, LAW & ROSENBAUM, supra note 3, at 47-52.
30. Lee, supra note 2, at 147-50.
31. H. R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. 1, at 27.
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ww-1395yy. For a full explanation of the Prospective
Payment System, see MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION (MEDPAC),
REPORT TO CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 40-44 (March 2005), available

at http://www.medpac.gov/publications/generic-report-display.cfm?report,-typeid=l&sid=2&subid=0.
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regarding potential PPS fallout: first, hospitals' refusal to
undertake any care and turning away patients with lifeand health-threatening emergencies and second, the
premature discharge of patients with unstabilized, but
costly, emergency medical conditions.
In response to these concerns, EMTALA imposes
fundamental obligations on all Medicare-participating
hospitals, regardless of the insured status of persons
seeking care. Since Medicare finances more than 30% 33of all
its
hospital care expenditures in the United States,
potential to influence hospital conduct was obvious.
34
The legislative history accompanying the House bill
underscored members' caution that "pressures for greater
hospital efficiency" as a result of PPS not be "construed as
license to ignore traditional community responsibilities and
loosen historic standards. ' 35 This caution was expressed
through Medicare amendments that transformed society's
expectations of hospitals into a broad, enforceable federal
legal obligation to undertake care in medical emergencies,
regardless of who sought the care, and regardless of ability
to pay. 36 Because the EMTALA amendments contained no
financing mechanism, the Congressional Budget Office
scored the obligations as being without cost to the federal
government. 37 In essence, the establishment of screening
and stabilization obligations in medical emergencies
became a quid pro quo for Medicare hospital financing.
obligationsbasic
two
encompasses
EMTALA
paralleling Congress' twin concerns-on all Medicareparticipating hospitals with emergency departments. 38 The
first is the duty to furnish an "appropriate medical
screening examination" to "any individual" who "comes to"
the emergency department, where a "request is made on the
individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a

33. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 20, at 330, tbl.
119.
34. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. 1, at 27, pt. 3, at 5.
35. H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt.1, at 27.
36. See H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt.3, at 5.
37. See CBO cost estimates contained in H.R. REP. No. 99-241, at 83, tbl.2.
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2005).
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medical condition. '3 9 The second duty arises once the initial
exam uncovers the presence of an "emergency medical
condition;" 40 at this point, a hospital "must provide either"
for such "further medical examination and such treatment"
of the individual "within the staff and facilities available at
the hospital" as may "be required to stabilize the medical
condition," 41 or alternatively, for "transfer of the individual
to another medical facility" 42 in accordance with federal
standards. 43 The statutory transfer standard in essence
seeks to halt "patient dumping" by prohibiting the transfer
of unstable patients unless the transferring facility certifies
the medical appropriateness of the transfer and acts
appropriately to minimize its risks; in addition, the
transferring facility's physician who authorizes the transfer
must certify that the benefits of transfer reasonably can be
expected to outweigh the risks. 44 Transfers must be
conducted in an appropriate fashion in terms of the
procedures and resources used to move the patient and the
patient's accompaniment by detailed medical records. 45 In
addition, the facility receiving the transfer must have
consented to the transfer, 46 although facilities with regional
specialized systems (such as shock trauma centers) are
prohibited from discriminating in whom they accept for
transfer.
Within the overall obligation to screen and stabilize,
EMTALA requires considerable depth of care. Thus, the
statute obligates facilities to place their medical staff
specialists "on-call" to their emergency physicians in the
event that a specialist is required, either as a result of the
initial examination or where further diagnosis or treatment
becomes necessary to achieve stabilization. 47 As such, the
failure or refusal of an on-call physician to appear within a
39. Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(B).
43. 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(c)(2).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(1)(A)(ii).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2)(A)-(C).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2)(B).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1)(I)(iii).

508

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

reasonable time is a specifically sanctionable event,
although a physician who orders a medically appropriate
of necessary specialty
transfer as the result of the absence
48
care, is not subject to sanction.
It is also worth noting that the statutory obligation to
stabilize patients does not appear to be location-limited.
That is, the law requires that "within the staff and facilities
available at the hospital," the facility provide "such further
medical examination and such treatment as may be
required to stabilize the condition." 49 Thus, under the
statute, there would appear to be no stopping point to the
stabilization obligation; indeed, stabilization can last
months.50
EMTALA's definitions further clarify the scope of the
statute. The law defines an emergency medical condition as
a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to
result in--(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect
to a pregnant woman, the health of the woman or her unborn
child) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily
functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part; or
(B) with respect to a pregnant woman who is having contractions-(i) that there is inadequate time to effect a safe transfer to another
hospital before delivery, or (ii) that transfer may pose5 1 a threat to
the health or safety of the woman or the unborn child.

Under EMTALA, furthermore,
[t]he term "to stabilize" means, with respect to an emergency
to provide such medical treatment of the
medical condition ....
condition as may be necessary to assure, within reasonable
medical probability, that no material deterioration of the condition
is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of the

48. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(C).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A).
50. See, e.g., Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir. 1994)
(EMTALA case in which the patient, once admitted, remained over four
months). But see Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 771 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding
no duty to stabilize under EMTALA in the absence of a transfer).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1).
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individual from a facility or ... [in the case of a pregnant woman
in labor], to deliver (including the placenta).52

Governmental enforcement of EMTALA is carried out
by the United States Department of Health and Human
Services through its Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (the federal agency that administers Medicare and
oversees Medicare provider agreements) and the Office of
the Inspector General, which has authority over EMTALA's
financial penalty provisions. 53 The individual right of
enforcement is express; at the same time, the law limits
financial recovery to damages that are "available for
personal injury under
the law of the State in which the
hospital is located." 54
The authors' practical and research-related experiences
with EMTALA enforcement have helped illuminate for us
the difference between how hospitals view the legal and
financial burdens of EMTALA compared to other legal
duties (such as health care quality standards), adherence to
which also can be complex and costly. 55 First, EMTALA
violations tend to lead to more pronounced and systemically
visible legal consequences than "simple" malpractice
actions. 56 It is only in the rarest of malpractice cases that

52. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A). The fact that drafters felt compelled to
specify "including the placenta" should provide readers some insight as to the
types of inappropriate transfers that went on. In 1984, for example, Professor
Rosenbaum became involved in a situation in South Texas in which physicians
of a community health center were ordered to remove their uninsured patient
from the local hospital delivery room (following a long fight to get her admitted
to begin with, which culminated with rushing her past the admissions desk
when the staff changed at the end of the day) prior to completion of a delivery,
including the placenta and necessary suturing to stop hemorrhagic bleeding.
53. Lee, supra note 2, at 157-60.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1396dd(d)(2)(A).
55. For example, hospitals generally do not claim that they cannot afford to
comply with national professional and legal standards of health care quality,
even though compliance clearly carries weighty financial implications.
56. Where screening services are concerned, courts are quite careful to
distinguish between an EMTALA claim (the discriminatory failure to furnish
screening services of comparable scope to services furnished other patients) and
malpractice claims (the failure to furnish services of adequate quality). See, e.g.,
Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. of Arkadelphia, 91 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1986) (en
banc). At times, this effort to distinguish between an EMTALA claim and a
professional negligence claim can appear to verge on the extreme, since a
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state health regulators might descend on a hospital.57 In
the case of EMTALA, on the other hand, on-site federal
investigators and a good deal of publicity are not out of the
ordinary.
Second, in EMTALA, the potential legal exposure goes
beyond civil money penalties, since noncompliance
effectively
can
implicate
the
hospital's
Medicare
participation itself.58 Certainly a medical error, if
sufficiently serious, could also lead to loss of a facility's
operating license (which in turn would trigger the loss of
Medicare participation rights). But health care licensure
agencies simply do not appear to occupy the same
"psychological
space"
in
the
heads
of hospital
administrators and their counsel.
Third, the EMTALA statute focuses on a part of the
hospital that is frankly unpopular. A hospital's emergency
department is the very part of a facility that many
administrators and medical staff would like to forget. Even
in a "high end" hospital that caters to the "carriage trade,"
by and large, the emergency department treats the poor,
the very ill, the unsponsored-and often, the strange and
difficult patient. The hardest work in an emergency
department typically comes in the middle of the night,
when everyone would prefer to sleep, and specialists hardly
want to be rousted to treat a person who is not even their
personal patient. Days off for a relaxing outing can go up in
smoke in an instant with a single emergency. 59 In short, as
vital as they might be to their communities, emergency
quality claim might lie in the failure to do anything at all and conversely,
discriminatory care is substandard care. Nonetheless, the courts appear to have
interpreted the law's preemption provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f), also to
include non-preemption of state law remedies.
57. ROSENBLArT, LAw & ROSENBAUM, supra note 3, at 968-74.

58. Technically the law is not a "condition of participation." See 42 U.S.C. §
1395cc. But the statute functions as such in that investigations of EMTALA
violations by the Office of the Inspector General are also referred to the Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the federal agency that oversees Medicare
and provider participation in the program.
59. In the first and highly celebrated formal prosecution of a case by the
Inspector General, Burditt v. U.S. Dep't. of Health and Human Servs., 934 F.2d
1362 (5th Cir. 1991), a specialist who was contacted to come to the emergency
department to help treat an emergency case refused to leave his duck hunting
excursion and ordered the nurses to send the patient (a woman in emergency
labor) away.
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departments simply are not a source of joy and personal
reward to hospitals, although the revenues flowing from the
admission of emergency cases actually can be quite
lucrative.60
Hospital unhappiness with EMTALA grew as the use of
emergency departments climbed and enforcement efforts
rose. Following a slow start, HHS enforcement efforts
gained steam throughout the 1990s, as did the number of
private actions. 61 These legal developments coincided with a
notable rise in the rate of use of hospital emergency
departments. 62 A 2003 General Accounting Office (GAO)
study found that two-thirds of hospitals reported having to
go on "[d]iversion," meaning that "[h]ospitals request that
ambulances bypass their emergency departments and
transport patients that would have been otherwise taken to
63
those emergency departments to other medical facilities."

60. Glenn A. Melnick et. al., Emergency Department Capacity and Access in
California, 1990-2001: An Economic Analysis, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 24, 2004, at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.136v1.
61. See cases in Lee, supra note 2, and standard health law textbooks. Many
of the most important cases construing the extent of the obligation were decided
in the mid-to-latter 1990s.
62. One leading study of hospital emergency room use reported a significant
16% rise in the use of hospital emergency services between 1996 and 2001, a
period of time when the uninsured rate actually declined slightly. Peter
Cunningham & Jessica May, Insured Americans Drive Surge in Emergency
Department Visits, ISSUE BRIEF: FINDINGS FROM HSC (Center for Studying
Health System Change), Oct. 2003, at 1, http://hschange.org/CONTENT/613.
This study reported more than 100 million visits to hospital emergency
departments during 2001; it attributed much of this growth in the use of
hospital emergency care to changes in care-seeking patterns among insured
persons, not simply to more use by the uninsured. Id. In the case of insured
persons, the study reported that the rising trend in emergency department
usage coincided with a rising trend in the use of ambulatory health care
generally, while in the case of the uninsured, the rise in emergency room use
coincided with a 37% decline in the use of physician care services. Id. at 2.
Between 1996-1997 and 2001-2002, hospital emergency department visits rose
from 17% to more than 25% of all outpatient medical care visits made by the
uninsured. Id. at 2-3. In addition, the study concluded that fewer than half of
all emergency department visits which occurred over the 1997-2001 time period
were for conditions that health care experts would classify as emergent (care
needed within fifteen minutes) or urgent (care needed within an hour). Id. at 3.
Poor, publicly insured, and uninsured patients showed more serious conditions
and waited longer to be seen. Id. at 4.
63. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-460, HOSPITAL EMERGENCY
DEPARTMENTS: CROWDED CONDITIONS VARY AMONG HOSPITALS AND COMMUNITIES

512

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

In another survey, 62% of all U.S. hospitals reported being
"at" or "over" operating capacity, with the proportion rising
to 79% for urban hospitals, 64 and 87% for Level I trauma
centers. 65 Both studies cited the lack of inpatient capacity
as a prime cause of long emergency department delays, as
patients needing an inpatient bed were forced to wait and
effectively became emergency department "boarders,"
receiving care in sub-optimal settings while simultaneously
straining already overextended emergency department
staff, treatment space, and equipment.
These facility experiences were hardly surprising,
considering the rise in annual emergency department visits
over the decade and the loss of emergency capacity as 66a
result of hospital closures during the same period.
Findings from our community study sites indicate that the
interaction of volume increases and facility closures led to a
nearly 45% increase in67 the average volume of visits per
emergency department.
Other factors in overcrowding beyond increased
demand and a reduced supply of services are also worth
noting. For example, while the common wisdom says that
emergency departments are overrun by uninsured persons,
the reality may be much different. As noted, one highly
emergency
study found that increased
publicized
department utilization was chiefly the result of more visits
by insured individuals.6 8 More recent work has reinforced
6 (Mar. 2003), http:lwww.gao.gov/new.items/dO3460.pdf.
64. THE LEWIN GROUP, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT OVERLOAD: A GROWING
CRISIS; THE RESULTS OF THE AHA SURVEY OF EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT AND

HOSPITAL CAPACITY 4 (Apr. 2002), http://www.hospitalconnect.com/aha/
pressroom-info/content/ EdoCrisisSlides .pdf.
65. Id. at 7. Level I trauma centers are designed to have the ability to
provide the full continuum of the most comprehensive care for injured patients
and are so designated by the American College of Surgeons. These are the most
advanced trauma centers.
66. See Linda F. McCaig & Catherine W. Burt, National Hospital
Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 2002 Emergency Department Summary (Mar.
18, 2004), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad340.pdf.
67. It is worth reinforcing that our study sites were selected for their
representative nature and thus represented both affluent and depressed
communities. Our study methodology is discussed at greater length infra Part
III.
68. Cunningham & May, supra note 62.
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and expanded upon these findings, demonstrating that
uninsured individuals are no more likely to use emergency
departments than persons who are insured, and indeed,
that having a usual source of care appears
to be associated
69
with greater emergency department use.
While these statistics may seem counterintuitive, to
some observers the data are not surprising. The uninsured
may not be flooding emergency departments because they
know that ultimately they will be expected to pay out-ofpocket for the care. In contrast, for the insured with a
regular source of health care, an emergency department
may in fact be the shortest route to a specialist, as
overwhelmed physicians, unable to schedule patients for
days or weeks, may be more likely to tell their patients to
go to the emergency department. Some health policy
experts and emergency medicine physicians theorize that
physicians may be more apt to refer their patients to
emergency departments out of concern over potential
medical liability exposure if they cannot see a patient
immediately. 70 Thus, the drivers of this crisis may be
broader and deeper than care-seeking by uninsured persons
and may include factors such as the clash of expectations of
immediate care among persons with the means to pay with
a constrained supply of specialty care and underlying
physician practice patterns and liability concerns. The
enactment of state "prudent layperson" statutes in recent
years, 71 which obligate insurers and managed care
organizations to cover emergency visits based on the
symptoms as understood by a "prudent layperson" rather
than the actual diagnosis of health professionals, may have
further propelled visits by insured persons unable to secure
timely specialty access 72 or unwilling to wait. Finally, data
69. Ellen J. Weber et al., Does Lack of a Usual Source of Care or Health
Insurance Increase the Likelihood of an Emergency Department Visit? 45
ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 4, 6-7 (2005).

70. See Robert A. Berenson et al., Medical MalpracticeLiability Crisis Meets
Markets: Stress in Unexpected Places (Sept. 2003), http://www.hschange.org/

CONTENT/605.
71. See Nurit Guttman et al., The Many Faces of Access: Reasons for
Medically Non-Urgent Emergency Visits, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1089,

1114-15 (2003).
72. See, e.g., State Appeals Court Holds HMO Breached Contract by
Delaying Referral, 14 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 265, 265-66 (Feb. 24, 2005). In
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suggest that patients using emergency
departments may
73
simply be sicker than they once were.
Other factors have amplified these trends. Shortages of
nurses and the steady shrinkage of inpatient hospital
capacity have made it harder for institutions to move
patients through the emergency department and admit
them in a timely fashion when necessary. Fewer "on-call"
specialists could worsen crowding, as patients are forced to
wait for consultative services. 74 Traditional relationships
and organizational structures within hospitals also could
exacerbate crowding, as the management "silos" of hospital
emergency departments fail to properly interact with other
portions of the facility. Operational factors are ones over
which hospitals can be expected to have considerable
influence. In recent years, experts have begun to question
whether a focus on improving the hospital management
processes that affect the flow of patients through and out of
the emergency department, could fix overcrowding and
bottlenecks. If the social and external dimensions of the
problem were outside the hospital's control, nonetheless,
perhaps other processes within the control of hospitals in a
total institutional (not merely emergency care) context,
could be improved.
Although hospital management experts had begun to
focus on hospital operations themselves, it is also
understandable that to a certain degree, hospital leaders
might have reacted by giving up trying to cope with the
crisis and instead begin to look for broader reforms to help
address the problem. It certainly should come as no
surprise therefore, that as growing legal enforcement
coincided with growing demand and shrinking resources,
the pressure for reduction or elimination of EMTALA legal
obligations grew. Indeed, so agitated had hospitals become
Kotler v. PacifiCare of California, 24
California Court of Appeals upheld a
contract following its failure to find
member, thereby forcing the member to

Cal. Rptr. 3d 447 (Ct. App. 2005), a
claim against an HMO for breach of
an infectious disease specialist for a
go out of network for care.

73. Susan Lambe et al., Trends in the Use and Capacity of California's
Emergency Departments, 1990-1999, 39 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 389, 393-94
(2002).
74. Loren A. Johnson et al., The Emergency Department On-Call Backup
Crisis: Finding Remedies for a Serious Public Health Problem, 37 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 495, 497 (2001).
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about their EMTALA duties that the initial response of
HHS to hospital obligations in the face of a bioterror attack
was to post information on its website suggesting
(preposterously it would seem, given the requirements of
EMTALA) that hospitals could deny screening and
stabilization services to persons
who sought emergency care
75
following a bioterror attack.
Regulations promulgated in 200376 by HHS appear to
relax prior statutory interpretations in three significant
respects. First, the rules limit the reach of hospitals'
threshold obligation to undertake screening services at all.
The rules narrow the threshold obligation by providing that
the statutory screening obligation (which turns on the fact
77
that an individual "comes to the emergency department")
is not triggered unless a person seeking care "[h]as
presented
at
a
hospital's
dedicated
emergency
department," 78 or "[h]as presented on hospital property"
requesting care or appearing or behaving in a manner that
would suggest an emergency to a "prudent layperson," 79 or
is coming to the hospital by
"ground or air ambulance" in
certain specified situations.8 0
In addition, the regulations also narrow the reach of the
EMTALA statute in two ways. The rules reinterpret the
stabilization requirements as ending upon inpatient
admission.81 This limitation is conditioned on the existence

75. Letter from Steven A. Pelovitz, Director of Survey and Certification
Group, CMS, to Regional Administrators of State Survey Agencies (Nov. 8,
2001), at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/survey-cert/1 10801. asp. Sanctions
for EMTALA violations can be suspended at Secretarial discretion as a result of
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Net of
2002. See P.L. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594, 627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320b-5(b) (2005)); Sara Rosenbaum & Brian Kamoie, Findinga Way Through
the Hospital Door: The Role of EMTALA in Public Health Emergencies, 31 J. L.
MED. & ETHICS 590 (2003).

76. Medicare Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,222-53,261 (Sept. 9, 2003) (codified
at 42 C.F.R. pts. 413, 482, 489).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (2005).
78. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b)(1) (2005).
79. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b)(2).
80. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b)(3).
81. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2).
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of a "good faith" admission, 82 but it is doubtful that a
patient discharged in an unstable state following an
admission ever could prove that the admission was merely
a subterfuge to terminate his or her EMTALA rights. One
previous judicial decision appears to provide support for the
proposition that stabilization obligations attach only to
transferred patients; to offset the impact, the rules also
clarify that the general Medicare
Conditions of
Participation would apply to all admitted patients, thereby
trying the discharge of unstable
patients to potential
sanctions for quality violations. 83
Finally, the rules narrow prior policy interpretations
governing the obligation to make on-call specialists
available, by specifying that even if a full complement of
specialists is within the staff and capabilities of the
hospital, a hospital is free to maintain an on-call list for
emergency coverage purposes "ina manner that best meets
the needs of the hospital's patients who are receiving
services required under [EMTALA] in accordance with the
resources available to the hospital. ' 84 The meaning of this
provision, and its application to individual situations, is
fuzzy, although the Preamble makes clear that the purpose
of the change is to allow on-call questions to be "worked out
between individual hospitals and their medical staff [sic]"
rather than holding hospitals to national on-call
reasonableness
standards.85 Ironically
perhaps, the
narrowing of the on-call obligation may increase the
potential for a transfer if no specialist is available, thereby
increasing a hospital's stabilization duties. (The potential
for increased transfers, of course, assumes that the transfer
is appropriate and that there is a receiving hospital willing
to accept the transfer; neither may in fact be true.)
In sum, EMTALA is a powerful and unique statute,
whose enactment echoed public expectations of hospital
conduct in emergencies, and whose increasingly rigorous
interpretation and enforcement coincided with a surge in
82. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(d)(2).
83. 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(c)(2)(iii); see Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767 (11th
Cir. 2002).
84. 42 C.F.R. § 489.240).
85. Medicare Program, 68 Fed. Reg. 53, 222, 53,254 (Sept. 9, 2003) (codified
at 42 C.F.R. pts. 413, 482, 489).
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the use of emergency care facilities. This surging use of
emergency care was, in turn, apparently driven by a host of
factors having little to do with the law itself. Nonetheless,
the existence of the law compelled hospitals to respond to
the surge, at least to some degree, with screening and
stabilization services rather than with an outright refusal
to furnish care. Growing agitation for a relaxation of
standards led to promulgation of the 2003 regulations,
which collectively make certain notable interpretive
changes in hospitals' obligations but leave EMTALA's
fundamental thrust in tact. The termination of EMTALA
rights at the point of admission and the diminution in oncall specialty requirements may in fact provide some
"release valve" for anti-EMTALA pressures, but the general
unhappiness with the law-as well as a continuing sense of
the statute as an enormous and unfunded mandateundoubtedly will continue to play a prominent role in U.S.
hospital policy.
Focusing solely on EMTALA obligations, however, can
cause one to miss the bigger picture. Despite its demands
on hospital resources, EMTALA is not triggered until a
person actually comes to the facility looking for care; as a
result, hospitals can discharge their EMTALA obligations
while remaining passive players in community health
systems. Unless and until a person with a suspected
emergency medical condition actually makes it to a
hospital's emergency department, the hospital is under no
legal obligation to engage in broader efforts to upgrade the
accessibility of community-based primary care services,
despite the fact that these services might in turn serve as
more appropriate sources of care. In other words, EMTALA
gives hospitals a "bye" on their community engagement and
asks only that they engage under certain narrowly defined
circumstances.
The implications of this sanctioned passivity are
particularly serious for persons with chronic conditions
such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes, mental illness or
addiction disorders, and asthma. These and other
conditions are considered by experts to be amenable to
ambulatory management. If left unmanaged, however, they
ultimately can lead to medical emergencies requiring
intensive resources and rapid intervention to achieve
stabilization. Timely and effective outpatient care has been
shown to reduce the probability of admission for
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ambulatory care-sensitive conditions.8 6 But viewed in the
context of the relationship between hospitals and their
overall community health systems, EMTALA does nothing
by itself to either compel or incentivize hospital
involvement
in
broader
community
solutions
to
unnecessary institutional care. Indeed, the financial losses
to which hospitals are exposed under EMTALA ironically
may be more than offset by the revenues they gain through
the excessive and costly admission of persons with
conditions that could have been better treated in
communities.
To be sure, many hospitals have pursued strategies of
ongoing and active engagement in order to upgrade
community health resources. But many of the most active
players are themselves either public facilities or facilities
that serve a disproportionate percentage of poor residents;
in other words, they are already "on the hook" and thus
strongly incentivized toward more affirmative involvement.
Nothing about EMTALA would necessarily incentivize a
facility located in and serving an affluent part of a
community to reach out to improve community resources in
poorer areas. Indeed, in its structure, EMTALA reinforces
long-held views of hospitals as passive spaces to be utilized
by their medical staffs in accordance with their own
customs and practice preferences, 8and
otherwise without an
7
presence.
community
independent
U.S. tax policy does not require specific forms of
community benefit activities on the part of hospitals
claiming nonprofit tax exempt status (only a portion of all
U.S. hospitals).8 8 In recent years, Congress enacted a small
grants program to modestly incentivize community

86. See John Billings et al., Impact of Socioeconomic Status on Hospital Use
in New York City, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1993, at 162, 169.

87. The notion of hospitals as passive "doctors' workplaces" is longstanding
and still highly embedded in culture. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 145-79 (1983).

88. In 1969, the Internal Revenue Service issued Rev. Rul. 69-545, which
eliminated any obligation that in order to qualify for tax exempt status
hospitals would be obligated to care for patients for free or reduced charges. See
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. In 1983, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 83157, which abolished even the link between the exemption and the maintenance
of emergency services available to the community. See Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2
94.
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engagement between hospitals and community providers
such as community health centers and free clinics.8 9 But no
significant investment of funds has ever been made in order
to fundamentally redirect the performance and orientation
of hospitals toward their communities.

III. THE HOSPITAL EMERGENCY AND COMMUNITY CARE STUDY
In the fall of 2002, the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, concerned about the state of America's safety
net, launched the Urgent Matters program. Based at the
George Washington University School of Public Health and
Health Services, Urgent Matters had two goals: improving
hospitals' ability to respond to the increasing volume of
emergency department patients and simultaneously,
raising public awareness of the serious limitations in the
health care safety net for vulnerable populations, which in
turn threaten to escalate dependence on hospital emergency
departments. The program established a ten-hospital-site
learning and technical support collaborative 90 effort that
employed a series of highly regarded quality and
management improvement techniques (including "rapid
cycle change") 91 aimed at reducing emergency department
overcrowding. Simultaneously, project researchers led a

89. In 2000, Congress appropriated $25,000,000 to fund a demonstration
program to aid health care providers in banding together to serve uninsured
persons. By fiscal year 2003, the program had grown to more than $100,000,000
and Congress authorized the Healthy Communities Access Program. As of 2004,
there were 158 grantees, making the allocation of funds to any single
community a miniscule event. See the description supplied by the Healthy
Communities Access Coalition (2003), at http://www.hcac.info/history.html (last
visited June 4, 2005).
90. The hospitals included Boston Medical Center, Boston, MA; BryanLGH
Medical Center, Lincoln, NE; Elmhurst Hospital Center, Queens, NY; Inova
Fairfax Hospital, Fairfax County, VA; Grady Health System, Atlanta, GA;
Henry Ford Health System, Detroit, MI; St Joseph's Hospital and Medical
Center, Phoenix, AZ; The Regional Medical Center at Memphis, Memphis, TN;
University Health System, San Antonio, TX; and The University of California,
San Diego, CA. See Urgent Matters, Urgent Matters Communities (2003), at
http://www.urgentmatters.org/about/umcommunities.htm (last visited May 19,
2005).
91. For a fuller discussion of rapid cycle change and related quality
improvement techniques, see Mike Stoecklein, Quality Improvement Systems,
Theories and Tools, in THE HEALTHCARE QUALITY BOOK: VISION, STRATEGY, AND
TOOLS 63 (Scott B. Ransom et al. eds., 2005).
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in the
detailed assessment of the health care "safety net"
92
communities served by each participating hospital.
A. Hospital Emergency DepartmentPerformance
Improvement
Participating hospitals were chosen through a
competitive selection process; the criteria applied in the
selection process (which was overseen by an expert advisory
committee) included the presence within the hospital of a
Level I or Level I193 trauma center, as well as patient
volume, evidence of overcrowding, and commitment to
serving uninsured and other vulnerable populations.
Selected facilities began the process of collaboration
immediately and continued their collaboration with
Foundation support for one year. During this twelve-month
time period, hospitals also had access to a variety of
resources including on-site technical assistance, defined
metrics for measuring patient flow and system
performance, a model for understanding patient flow,
improvement techniques, and a toolkit of
training in quality
94
best practices.
The Urgent Matters project researchers hypothesized
that several fundamental drivers underlie emergency
department overcrowding: "input" drivers related to a high
volume of demand including demand by medically
underserved persons with low incomes and inadequate or
no health insurance who rely on emergency departments for
treatment of conditions that could be treated (and better
managed) in more appropriate and less costly primary care

92. The communities around each hospital included Boston, MA; Lincoln;
NE; Queens, NY; Fairfax County, VA; Atlanta, GA; Detroit, MI; Phoenix, AZ;
Memphis, TN; San Antonio, TX; and San Diego, CA. See Urgent Matters,
Urgent Matters Communities (2003), at http://www.urgentmatters.org/about/
umcommunities.htm (last visited May 19, 2005).
93. Emergency departments are defined by the American Hospital
Association in its Annual Survey as "[h]ospital facilities for the provision of
unscheduled outpatient services to patients whose conditions require immediate
care. Must be staffed 24 hours a day." AM. HosP. ASS'N, AHA GUIDE TO THE
HEALTH CARE FIELD, at A7 (1999-2000 ed. 1999)

94. "Best practices" were identified through interviews and site visits with
the leadership of approximately sixty hospitals, conducted by George
Washington University researchers in 2002-2003.
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settings and "throughput" and "output" drivers linked to
hospital management and organizational practices, which
deter the efficient movement of patients out of emergency
care and either to inpatient care if needed or discharge if
appropriate.
The "Input/Throughput/Output" (I/T/O) model of
patient flow is depicted in Figure 1. This model provided a
structure for examining the factors that affect emergency
department operations and delays. Input factors are those
that help explain why people present to an emergency
department, such as aging and morbidity, availability of
alternative sites of care, insurance status, perceptions of
95
quality, physician referral practices, and other factors.
Throughput is centered on the actual operations of the
emergency department, including issues such as the
availability of on-call medical specialists, while output
pertains to the ability of the hospital to move patients out of
the emergency department in a timely fashion, often to an
inpatient bed. 96 The model assumes that the ability of an
emergency department to respond to demand is based on
complex factors, including the emergency department
interaction with the rest of the hospital.
Participating hospitals learned to implement changes
through a process known as rapid cycle testing, which
allowed the testing of hundreds of changes that combined
better management of care for patients who need services
with more rapid treatment and discharge for those who do
not need extensive services and improvement in decisionmaking around the need to go onto diversion status.

95. Urgent Matters, ED Crowding and the Safety Net (2003), at http://www.
urgentmatters.org/about/um-safety-net.htm (last visited May 19, 2005).
96. Id.
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Figure 1: Reproduced from Marcia J. Wilson & Khoa Nguyen, Bursting at the Seams: Improving
PatientFlow to Help America 's Emergency Departments, URGENT MATTERS (The George

Washington University Medical Center, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2004, at 5, at http://www.
urgentmatters.org/pdf/UM WhitePaper__BurstingAtTheSeams.pdf

model,
this
"input/throughput/output"
Using
researchers assessed participating hospitals' emergency
departments. The project also studied the communities
surrounding the ten participating Urgent Matters hospitals,
in order to develop a deeper understanding of the role that
emergency departments play as critical access points for
uninsured and insured patients alike.
Use of this model in conjunction with careful quality
often
led
to
dramatic
improvement
initiatives
improvements in emergency department (and overall
hospital) performance. For instance, the average duration of
a patient's visit to the emergency department at the
Regional Medical Center in Memphis, Tennessee, decreased
by 44%, to approximately five hours, over the course of the
project. This result was related to the fact that the average
bed assignment time for admitted emergency department
patients decreased from 1057 to 55 minutes over the same
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period. Other project hospitals experienced significant
improvements in operations, with Boston Medical Center
decreasing the amount of time on "diversion" by 40% and
St. Joseph's Hospital and Medical Center in Phoenix,
Arizona, decreasing the proportion of patients who leave
the emergency department without being seen from 21% to
7%. Notably, nine of the ten hospitals reported a reduction
or no change in hours on diversion. For example, Inova
Fairfax Hospital, Virginia, reported that the monthly hours
on diversion decreased from 136 to 21 over the course of the
project. Hence, reductions in overcrowding and delays
appear to have come from improvements in operations, not
restrictions on access such as increased use of diversion. In
most of these hospitals, the greatest gains came from
improvements in their ability to move patients from the
97
emergency department to an inpatient bed expeditiously.
These results underscored for participants the fact that
emergency department overcrowding is not simply a
function of demand generated outside the hospital: it also is
a function of internal hospital management and
organizational structure. As patient flow management
techniques improved (in particular, improving the
expeditious assignment patients to inpatient beds when
needed), crowding declined. The hospitals' experience
revealed that management interventions designed to speed
the "throughput" and "output" of emergency department
patients could greatly reduce patient delays in receiving
needed care. These changes tended to involve systems and
incentives designed either to accelerate traditional
as triage,
such
processes
department
emergency
registration, and specialty consultation, or to influence
hospital-wide systems, such as those that facilitate the
admission of a patient from the emergency department to
an inpatient unit. Figure 2 summarizes the most important
management interventions identified in the project.

97. For greater detail on some of the experiences of the project hospitals,
see Marcia J. Wilson & Khoa Nguyen, Bursting at the Seams: Improving
Patient Flow to Help America's Emergency Departments, Urgent Matters
(The George Washington University Medical Center, Washington, D.C.),
1,
at
http://www.urgentmatters.org/pdf
2004,
at
Sept.
UMWhitePaperBurstingAtTheSeams.pdf.
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Category

StrategiesAnnovations

Patient Flow
Coordination and
Facilitation

frnpeient a 'Bed Czar or patient fow manager by desgnatng a spedcic
posin responsitle for ensuring the timely transfer of El patients to assigned
inpatient beds
Dedicate a nurse with adnissbon/dschargemnsfer duties who is specifyicay
resporsbe for
faclitatig pen&V dlsdharges to accelerate avlabie beds
for admit

Early Discharger

Develop accelerated triage and registration processes to tilage more effiderty
based on the paten s aouy and to redioe patient wafting times by re-orderin
or onhng triage and registration processes
Initiate prelitnay drschage by designating patients for early discharge the
nea day
Redesign rounding and crischarge processs to focus on patients read
tor discharge
Create a dscharge ioornbune for inpatients that have been dscharged anj
are awaftin transportation, medications or educatn
Estatlish a disctrge coordinator position to coordnate procuring Information
that is recuired to discharge the patient
hern ent faral (bonuses) and nan-finanal (m /e tickets or cafeteria

vouchrs) ihcentis for physAians and nurses to ptornote effi cent and eadry
discharge of patients Who ae reacy to go horne
Boarding and
Inpatient Bed
Assignment

Replace the traitional push system" wifh a 'pt system' in wtch the inpatient
fio. pa an tie roa in puin ED patients into avate beds

Diversion
Management and
Reduction

Estatiish new protocols and tnonitoIng systems to deteimine when the hotaJ
Isapproaching mxfmin operating capacity and its threshid for d1version
Develop a hosptal-wide dversibn respose protocol to focus eksling mesouroes
on facidating all appropote patient discharges ina more timely manner
Ceate a ommutity-wlde d&ersion pl;an in collaboration with loca hospitals and
the community's emergency medical seNces unt to establsh common protool
for hospals gcing on ond off diversion or bpass

Figure 2: Reproduced from Marcia J.Wilson & Khoa Nguyen, Bursting at the Seams: Improving

PatientFlow to Help America 's Emergency Departments, URGENT MATTERS (The George
Washington University Medical Center, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2004, at 11,
at http://www.
urgentmatters.org/pdf/UM-WhitePaperBurstingAtTheSeams.pdf.
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B. The Community Perspective
Using a combination of methods, including site visits,
in-depth interviews with over 300 stakeholders across the
communities, twenty-six focus groups with low-income
patients who were likely to be either uninsured or covered
by Medicaid, literature reviews, and analyses of publiclyavailable data, we developed profiles of health care
utilization within each community's safety net of health
care services for low-income, underserved, and vulnerable
populations. Not surprisingly, we found that emergency
departments served as the "safety net of the safety net." We
also found that there was remarkable consistency across
the communities in terms of the ways that patients viewed
the quality and availability of emergency services.
In every community, patients' awareness of the
availability of emergency services was considerably higher
than their knowledge about the availability of other safety
net services. This held true even for patients who were new
to the area or the country. For example, we held focus
groups with immigrants who spoke Spanish, Cantonese,
Arabic, Haitian, Creole, and Vietnamese. Many of these
individuals had been in the United States less than two
years, yet virtually all knew about at least one emergency
department in their community, and many had used these
facilities for themselves or a family member. Many, but not
all, knew that they could receive care from the emergency
department regardless of insurance status or ability to pay.
The vast majority of patients in the other focus groups were
also aware of these provisions. When questioned about the
availability of primary care, specialty services, low-cost
pharmaceuticals, mental health or dental services, many
patients indicated that they had no idea where they could
receive this care, although most were more knowledgeable
about care options for young children.
In every community, patients viewed care in the
emergency department as being superior to care provided in
most other settings. This assessment was based in part on
the feeling that emergency department physicians and
nurses were extremely well-trained and capable, and in
part on the recognition that the full range of diagnostic
services and specialty care were accessible through the
emergency department. Time and again, patients said that
despite the long waits associated with emergency care, they
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turned to emergency services because they could get the
care they needed and could see the "best" doctors,
regardless of what was wrong with them.
The community analysis underscored the realities of
health care access for low-income, underserved patients
who often seek care from busy hospital facilities: despite
ostensibly long wait times, the emergency department is
likely to be the shortest route to needed care, even when
that care does not necessarily have to be provided in an
emergency department.
Three trends were apparent in our studies of the ten
communities. First, patients routinely use the emergency
department for care that could safely be provided in other
settings. Using an emergency care use profiling algorithm
developed by Billings and colleagues at New York
University, 98 we analyzed emergency department visits at
the ten Urgent Matters consortium hospitals to determine
the proportion that could safely have been treated in nonemergency settings. The algorithm applies only to visits
that did not result in an inpatient admission. We found that
across the ten sites, 21.4% of visits were non-emergent (in
other words, they did not require care within twelve hours)
and another 20.6% were emergent, but could have safely
been treated in a setting other than the emergency
department. 99
Second, low-income
patients have considerable
difficulties accessing specialty, mental health, and dental
services. This is particularly true of uninsured patients but
can also hold true for patients covered by Medicaid (where
providers willing to accept Medicaid payments may be
scarce, especially within certain specialties and in certain
markets) and patients with commercial insurance. We
spoke to many patients and providers who described a
growing number of underinsured individuals who
98. For a discussion of the algorithm and the potential implications of its
findings, see John Billings et al., Emergency Room Use: The New York Story,
ISSUE BRIEF (The Commonwealth Fund, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 2000, at 1, 2-4,
at http://www.cmwt.org/usr.doc/billings nystory.pdf.
99. Marsha Regenstein et al., Walking a Tightrope: The State of the Safety
Net in Ten U.S. Communities, URGENT MATTERS (The George Washington
University Medical Center, Washington, D.C.), May 2004, at 1, 37, at
http://www.urgentmatters.org/pdf/SNA-files/UrgentMatters-Walking-A-Tightr
ope.zip.
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essentially carry catastrophic coverage with high out-ofpocket deductibles and co-payments. Thus, low-income,
privately insured individuals also turn to the safety netincluding the emergency department to supplement their
other sources of health care. For uninsured and insured
patients alike, the emergency department is a shortcut to
emergent and non-emergent services that they cannot
access from other providers in a reasonable amount of time.
With each community reporting waits for at least some
specialty services in the three to ten month range, it is not
difficult to see how valuable the emergency department has
become as a source of primary and specialty care.
Third, patients across all of the communities indicated
that they were extremely reluctant to use emergency
services, and would go to the emergency department only
when, in their estimation, it was absolutely necessary. This
may seem inconsistent with other trends, but the
sentiments were clear and consistent across the ten
communities: regardless of their trust in the health
professionals they found there, patients hated going to the
emergency department. They dreaded the long waits, they
complained of rude treatment at times by hospital staff,
and, although most knew they could receive care without
payment at the point of service, they tried to delay or forgo
care because they also knew they would eventually receive
a bill for the services. Although most individuals were quick
to bring their children to the emergency department if they
felt they needed to be seen by a doctor, the majority
indicated that, where they were the patient, they tended to
put off seeking emergency care for as long as possible.
Again, there was consistency across the ten communities:
the most common reason given for finally going to the
emergency department for care was that their pain became
so severe, or lasted for so long, that they were no longer
able to endure their conditions. In other words, regardless
of whether their conditions met clinical definitions of
"emergency," they were severe enough in their view to
justify the intervention.
The research also yielded critical findings regarding
health care safety net itself in each of the study
communities. Between one-quarter and one-third of
residents in the ten Urgent Matters communities were
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either uninsured or covered through public insurance
programs for low-income persons such as Medicaid' 00 and
the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)101
and thus more likely to turn to safety net providers for
basic health care given their more limited access to
physicians in private practice.1 02
Communities also were found to differ substantially
with respect to the size and scope of their safety nets, with
state and local financing to support the safety net subject to
considerable variation. Assessing community service
capacity for vulnerable populations across all ten sites,
researchers concluded that primary health care services
(i.e., preventive care, diagnostic and treatment of relatively
routine acute health problems, and routine management of
chronic health conditions) was relatively high, with the
highest presence in communities that had succeeded in
securing dedicated financing through programs such as the
federal health centers program, 0 3 to establish and develop
services. However, specialty care was strained, behavioral
care quite limited, and dental care nonexistent. The results
are illustrated in Figure 3.

100. See id. at 12-13. Medicaid is codified at Title XIX of the Social Security
Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a-1396r (2002). In 2003, Medicaid covered 52,000,000
persons at a total state/federal cost of approximately $250 billion. See The
Medicaid Program at a

Glance, KAISER

COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND

THE

UNINSURED (The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2005,
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/
getfile.cfm&PageID=50450.
101. See Regenstein, supra note 99, at 12-13. The State Children's Health
Insurance Program, is a smaller companion to Medicaid, covering "targeted"
low-income children who are ineligible for Medicaid and otherwise uninsured.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397jj (2002); Sara Rosenbaum et al., Public Health
Insurance Design for Children: The Evolution from Medicaid to SCHIP, 1 J.
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1 (2004).
102. See Regenstein, supranote 99, at 12.
103. See id. at 22-23. The Health Centers program is authorized as part of
the Public Health Service Act. 42 U.S.C. § 254c. The program provides grants to
medically underserved communities to establish primary health care clinics. In
2003, over 800 health centers furnished services in several thousand sites, but
estimates of need in relation to capacity showed enormous gaps in service
capacity. See generally Health Centers as Safety Net Providers:An Overview and
Assessment of Medicaid's Role, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED
(The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., New York, N.Y.), May 2003, available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/14342-l.pdf.

529

EMTALA

20051
Primary

Specialty

Emergency

Behavioral

Dental

Safety Net

Care

Care

Department

Health

Care

Integration

Atlanta

0

0

0

o

0

0

Boston

•

(3

•

Detroit

0

0

0

0

0

Fairfax County

0

0

S

0

0

0

Uncoln

0

0

S

0

0

(a

Memphis

0

O

S

0

0

Phoenix

0

0

0

o

0

0

(

0
S

(1

0

S

0

S

0

0

0

0

0

0

Queens
San Antonio

0

0

San Diego

High 0 Medium (

0

1

Low 0

~

M
'rtiY7PiAs sasSChiJf Mdbfc HwAian
Sor"_ TheGxxoio WasPrcy
ANts&an, t,,h 2004.
Ogw't Mattrs Sa"

t Sn~s 0~t

e fteat Poky

Figure 3: Reproduced from Marsha Regenstein et al., Walking a Tightrope: The State of the Safety

Net in Ten U.S. Communities, URGENT MATTERS (The George Washington University Medical
Center, Washington, D.C.), May 2004, at 4, 37, at http://www.urgentmatters.org/pdf/SNA-files/
UrgentMattersWalkingATightrope.zip.

IV. USING EMTALA TO INCENTIVIZE ACTIVE COMMUNITY
ENGAGEMENT AMONG HOSPITALS

The EMTALA statute is unique in health law, creating
an enforceable right to certain types of health care for
suspected or documented emergency medical conditions. At
the same time, EMTALA implicitly adheres to the
essentially passive character of hospitals; despite their
obligations, they are permittedto remain institutions whose
duties are triggered when individuals either are electively
admitted or else seek them out when in dire need of care.
Federal regulations promulgated in 2003 tend to reinforce
this limited view of hospitals' role in their communities by
narrowing EMTALA's reach in initial screening, patient
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stabilization, and the obligation to provide specialty
resources of the hospital to emergency cases.
The Urgent Matters project was initiated at a time of
major pressure for EMTALA reform. This is ironic, since
the project's central findings, published approximately
eight months after issuance of the revised 2003 rules,
indicate that, at a minimum, some of the EMTALA
"downscaling" evident in the rules may have been
premature. The Urgent Matters findings suggest that, to at
least a significant degree, emergency
department
overcrowding can be attributed not to widespread and
clinically unjustifiable consumption of hospital emergency
care resources (only 20% of emergency department
utilization could be considered inappropriate in terms of the
presence of an emergent condition), but instead, to a
combination of organizational and management weaknesses
coupled with a heavy reliance on emergency departments
by the surrounding community, many but not all, of whose
members face access barriers and are in considerable need
of health care. Access in the study communities was
weakest with respect to the very specialty services that
EMTALA is supposed to provide, but whose availability
now has potentially been further limited. Furthermore, our
findings suggest that even where alternative community
resources exist, at least for basic management of serious
health conditions, community residents fail to understand
their availability, and thus will endure long waits for care,
in difficult health care environments, in order to be seen.
The picture that emerges is not that of heavy overuse of
care, but lengthy delays in securing essential services, as
well as reliance on unnecessarily difficult and costly care
sites out of concerns over quality, ignorance of alternative
sources of care, or the inability to secure timely specialty
management for serious conditions.
To be sure, data show inappropriate use of emergency
departments by insured patients with serious health needs,
who are in one way or another looking to compensate for
what they perceive to be the failings of the health care
system to which they have access. This pattern suggests the
need for fundamental changes in the manner in which
insurers and health plans organize and buy health care
services for their members. There is really not much
incentive for insurers to make such deep changes, however,
since even in states with "prudent layperson" statutes,
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payment rates for covered benefits remain unregulated.
Thus, it is unclear whether insurers' financial losses
stemming from payment for "prudent layperson" care may
not be more than offset by financial gains from slowing the
use of insured benefits.
At the same time, much emergency care use is
attributable to lower-income, uninsured, and publicly
insured patients with little or no access to alternative
sources of care. Despite the existence of emergency
department overcrowding, this group may play a less
dominant role than anecdotes suggest. Nonetheless, these
patients are among the sickest and most vulnerable
members of the community, and they have the most to lose,
health-wise, from inadequate access to care.
Recent efforts to improve access to care have focused on
small grants to community organizational efforts, or the
expansion of the health centers program to finance the
establishment of more clinical care sites. These are
essential efforts and should be continued. By themselves
however, these investments do little to change the
fundamental behavior of hospitals, to incentivize them to
partner with primary care facilities to help keep patients
relatively healthy and in community care environments, or
to supply specialty care when needed. Indeed, health
centers report serious difficulties in securing specialty and
inpatient care when their patients need it.104
We believe that our research supports several
recommendations aimed at both upgrading hospitals'
emergency care capacities and improving hospital
interaction with their communities. The appropriate
management of a hospital's emergency department and
related facilities is an underlying factor critical to the
achievement of EMTAIA's fundamental goal of ensuring
appropriate emergency care access. The findings from this
study suggest that there is considerable room for
improvement. The input/throughput/output performance
measures and rapid-cycle improvement procedures used in
this project serve as a basis, in our view, for fashioning
performance standards related to Medicare hospital
104. See Michael K. Gusmano et al., Exploring the Limits of the Safety Net:
Community Health Centers and Carefor the Uninsured, HEALTH AFF., Nov.-Dec.
2002, at 188, 189-90.
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conditions of participation, which would measure the
quality of hospital emergency care and related services. So
significant were the emergency department crowding
reductions achieved through this project that, in our view,
our findings call into serious question the wisdom of
relaxing essential emergency care standards in the absence
of compelling evidence regarding active efforts on hospitals'
part to improve their performance where emergency
management is concerned. Indeed, the results from this
study indicate that more affirmative management of
hospital emergency resources may go a long way toward
improving emergency department performance without
reducing hospitals' legal obligations to perform in
emergencies. At the very least, the management lessons to
be drawn from this study should be used as a basis for
further refinement of Medicare conditions of participation
in order to ensure that continuous improvement in hospital
emergency care performance
is a basic program
expectation.
A second major lesson to be drawn from this project is
that the demand on hospital emergency care services is a
reflection of the serious barriers to accessible, timely, and
decent quality health care that confront millions of
Americans. The hundreds of focus group interviews
conducted over the course of this study underscore the
problems
endured
by low-income
and
vulnerable
populations at risk for medical underservice. For many,
health care is a critical service that must be used sparingly
because of its financial costs and the struggle associated
with its receipt. The burden of securing emergency care is
so great that individuals apparently will endure substantial
suffering and deterioration in health status rather than
seek care early. For reasons that are not easy to
understand, community residents do not appear to be
aware of more appropriate primary health care services
that might be available; at the same time, primary care
awareness cannot compensate for the shortages of specialty
care for physical and mental health conditions, as well as
the total absence of dental care.
These findings suggest to us the need for a fresh look at
how society expects hospitals to perform within broader
community health systems, as well as how compensation
arrangements coupled with certain legal incentives can be
used to encourage what we term "active engagement."
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EMTALA is fine as far as it goes; its terms guarantee basic
emergency care when help is sought from a dedicated
emergency department. This study suggests however, that
more is needed from modern hospitals than simply waiting
for emergency cases to show up. Communities need
hospitals that are fully engaged and active participants in
staffing, supporting, and widely publicizing affordable
sources of primary and ambulatory specialty health care.
We believe that two types of changes might propel
hospitals in the direction of active community engagement.
The first is the establishment of a federal compensation
arrangement that provides financial support to hospitals
involved in "active community engagement" efforts, which
would help offset the necessary costs that such "engaged"
hospitals incur in both carrying out their EMTALA
screening and stabilization requirements and undertaking
management improvement efforts related to emergency
care. One possible source of financing for such a program
would be a federal surtax on the sale of all insurance
products covering medical losses (i.e., not only health
insurance but worker's compensation plans, auto insurance,
and other forms of coverage that pay for medical care), as
well as on services purchased by public and private
employee health benefit plans. Given the community-wide
reliance on hospital emergency departments, it seems only
appropriate that all payers should contribute to the support
of emergency care facilities.
Beyond financing, a program furnishing financial
incentives for "active engagement" would require measures
of "community engagement." Consistent with the modern
movement toward "pay for performance" these measures
should not be ambiguous directives, but instead, precise
measures that participating facilities would have to satisfy,
as well as a process of information collection to document
satisfaction of the terms of payment. Measures of
''engagement" might consist of written
affiliation
agreements with community clinics providing for a specific
monthly volume of specialty referral services on a
subsidized basis, the provision of measurable amounts of
primary and specialty care in community settings, the colocation on hospital campuses of urgent care centers open
on a round-the-clock basis, and other quantifiable and
verifiable activities.
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In addition to direct financial incentives, an "active
engagement" program presumably would require the
establishment of certain safe harbors against liability for
fraud for hospitals that seek to collaborate with community
service providers in "engagement" programs, as well as the
possible creation of antitrust safety zones to insulate
participants against charges of anticompetitive horizontal
arrangements. Under current antitrust and fraud
principles, collaboration among hospitals and community
primary care services can constitute a basis for liability.
Even where the collaboration involves the admission and
treatment of low-income and medically vulnerable
populations, the ostensible lack of economic attractiveness
does not absolve facilities, since many patients might
qualify for Medicaid coverage. Congress has previously
granted safe harbors for arrangements that involve
collaborations between health care practices and certain
community health clinics, which might otherwise be
deemed violative of federal fraud and abuse laws. 105 In our
view, a program that incentivizes "active engagement"
through EMTALA payments would simply be an extension
of these earlier efforts to foster affiliations designed to
strengthen community health care systems for low-income
populations.
In a nation in which the non-elderly population has a
one in three chance of going without health insurance
coverage, the importance of the access guarantees created
by EMTALA can hardly be overstated. In recent years, the
emphasis has been on the scaling back of EMTALA's
protections without any policies aimed at the creation of
appropriate alternatives. The Bush Administration has
promoted expansion of the health centers program to
improve primary care access, but by themselves, health
centers cannot overcome barriers to specialty care.

105. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2287 (2003) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(3)(H) (2005)). This provision exempts from the scope of the
anti-kickback statute "any remuneration between a health center . . and any
individual or entity providing . . . services . . . to such health center entity
pursuant to a[n] . . . agreement, if such agreement contributes to the ability of
the health center entity to maintain or increase the availability, or enhance the
quality, or services provided to a medically underserved population served by
the health center entity."
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We believe that the evidence drawn from the Urgent
Matters study points to the need to emphasize greater
efficiencies in the administration of hospital emergency
services, while simultaneously coupling management
improvements with a fundamental shift in U.S. hospital
payment policy where emergency care is concerned.
EMTALA's real costs should be acknowledged-and they
should be compensated through a federal mechanism that
spreads the cost across all payers. In exchange, hospitals
should be expected to be actively engaged in the
improvement of health care in their communities, using
defined and measurable standards of engagement that
capture both primary and specialty access, as well as the
appropriate management of chronic conditions.

